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The Risks of Global Financial Markets and the
Importance of Credibility:
Implications for Hungarian Fiscal Policy
The central issue in the controversy about the adoption of the euro in Hungary is the diﬃculties associat-
ed with the fulﬁllment of the ﬁscal criterion and the possible growth sacriﬁce it requires. In this paper the
author examines the question whether the strategy of delaying entry into the euro-zone implies that ﬁs-
cal consolidation can be delayed as well. In approaching the problem the paper considers the origins and 
history of the present-day global ﬁnancial markets and argues that given the high degree of systemic risks
individual countries face responsible macroeconomic policies are crucial in minimizing vulnerability to 
crises. Consequently in order to avoid excessive interest rates and speculative inﬂows (or currency crisis in
the worst case scenario) ﬁscal deﬁcits in Hungary would have to be cut and credibility of ﬁscal policy rees-
tablished even without EMU accession. The overall conclusion from this overview is that delaying entry in 
order to delay ﬁscal adjustment is likely to increase the trade oﬀ between real and nominal convergence
instead of mitigating it.
JEL classiﬁcation: F33, F41, H62
I. Introduction
Following the accession to the European Union the next step in the integration proc-
ess for the new member states is the adoption of the common currency. Although there 
are still debates about the exact size of the expected beneﬁts of joining the euro, there is
a relative agreement that because of the increased level of trade, lower interest rates as 
well as the disappearance of currency risk the new member states will beneﬁt from the
EMU1. At the same time similarly to EU accession there are strict conditions for join-
ing the euro: the Maastricht criteria set the threshold of entry related to interest rate, 
debt level, ﬁscal deﬁcit and inﬂation. Among these thresholds the 3 percent limit on ﬁs-
cal deﬁcit is the most contested in the new member states given the potential trade oﬀ
between real and nominal convergence: long-term growth considerations require large-
scale investment into physical infrastructure, reforming the education and health care 
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sector, as well as channeling funds into research and development. Furthermore the 
costs of accession and the fulﬁllment of the acquis especially the environmental criteria
further increase the problem of fulﬁlling the ﬁscal criterion. While some of these claims
might be justiﬁed the political economy consequence of these arguments is that the im-
portance of ﬁscal adjustment is often downplayed, which necessarily implies that short-
term political considerations dominate economic rationality. This is the case in Hun-
gary where before his appointment the new Hungarian Prime Minister stated that the 
size of ﬁscal deﬁcit is only important for economic analysts2. The changing of the date
of introducing the euro in Hungary, which is without precedent in the history of EMU, 
also indicates that the political elite feels that they can postpone both ﬁscal adjustment
and EMU accession at their discretion without signiﬁcant economic costs. In this paper 
I will show the dangers associated with such an attitude by considering the nature of 
the global ﬁnancial environment. In particular I will argue that given the fragility of 
the global ﬁnancial system credible macroeconomic policies are crucial for small open
economies to reduce their vulnerability to crisis. Given reputational and institutional 
reasons the lack of credibility of Hungarian ﬁscal policy implies that ﬁscal consolida-
tion cannot be postponed regardless of the date of EMU accession. Failing to recognize 
this might ultimately augment the trade oﬀ between real and nominal convergence.
In order to show this in the second section of the paper I will provide an overview 
about the origins and history of the present-day global ﬁnancial markets and the sys-
temic risks individual countries face in this new environment. In the third section I will 
review the role of ﬁscal deﬁcit in assessing the vulnerability of a country to systemic
risks. The fourth section will deal with the concept of credibility as a means to mini-
mize vulnerability, while in the ﬁfth section these considerations are applied to the cur-
rent situation in Hungary with implications for the conduct of ﬁscal policy.
II. History and fragility of global ﬁnancial markets
Eﬃcient allocation of scarce resources is the goal of market economy and the key fac-
tor for long-term sustainable growth. The theory behind international capital markets is
to improve the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation and channel savings into the most
productive investments. Increased eﬃciency from global allocation of capital can come
from three factors: transfer savings from low to high return jurisdictions; potential for 
diversifying risks and increased competition among institutional investors (Summers 
2000:3). For the emerging economies the major implication is that a signiﬁcant con-
straint on long-run growth, the gap between their ﬁnancing needs and the level of do-
mestic savings, can be temporarily decreased3. In spite of these theoretical beneﬁts of
international ﬁnance free ﬂow of capital has been the exception rather than the rule
over the past 150 years and even during those exceptional periods when free ﬂow of cap-
ital was the dominant trend the costs of these gains were far from negligible. 
2 Reported in (Eörsi 2004:14).
3 The use of foreign savings to cover the investment needs of a country is not without limits: if exports do not cover im-
ports and proﬁt repatriation, eventually a high stock of foreign capital might lead to a deﬁcit on the current account,
which signals that the rate of growth cannot be sustained. See (Erdős 2003:188−194). This consideration might be be-
hind the Feldstein and Horioka puzzle: even with high level of capital mobility the ratio of domestic savings and in-
vestment rates is close to one. See Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
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The main cost of ﬁnancial openness can be derived from the open-economy tri-
lemma, which means that a country cannot have simultaneously free ﬂow of capital,
independent macroeconomic policy to support full employment and ﬁxed exchange
rate4. Only two of the three goods can be targeted, which means that the loss of the 
third good is the price to be paid for the other two. Over the past 150 years all the com-
binations have been tried and the choice was usually dominated by political factors 
and the existence or non-existence of cooperation among the major powers. The ﬁrst
era of global ﬁnance started in 1860 and lasted until 1914, when the gold standard en-
sured a ﬁxed exchange rate and capital was moving freely primarily from capital-abun-
dant to capital-scarce regions (Eichengreen 2003:24). Although even the gold standard 
allowed some freedom in macroeconomic policy as short-term interest rate diﬀeren-
tials existed among the diﬀerent countries (Taylor 2004:30), the extent of ﬁnancial glo-
balization during this period can be illustrated by the fact that world economy reached 
a comparable degree of integration again only by the mid-1990s (Obstfeld and Taylor 
2003:28). Between these two periods of ﬁnancial globalization diﬀerent choices were
made regarding the trilemma: during the interwar period the restoration of the prewar 
ﬁnancial system proved to be unsuccessful and the Great Depression brought about the
collapse of the gold standard. The emerging mass movements with the spread of de-
mocracy meant that independent macroeconomic policy could not be as easily given 
up as before the war (Spahn 2001:125). Thus the major economies opted for the strict
regulation of capital ﬂows, which meant that the previously creditor countries mostly
invested at home, while the traditional debtors had no access to capital. After the Sec-
ond World War the major powers realized the need for international cooperation on ﬁ-
nances and in Bretton Woods, which later became the name of this era, they set up the 
International Monetary Fund, to manage the structure of exchange rates among various 
currencies as well as to ﬁnance short-term imbalances of payments among countries,
and the World Bank to provide capital for development purposes. In order to preserve 
macroeconomic independence capital controls from the interwar period were main-
tained: ﬁnancial ﬂows were restricted to development aid and foreign direct investment
by American companies, who replaced their production in other developed countries in 
order to overcome trade barriers (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999:272). Under these condi-
tions the US dollar became the major reserve asset and was used in most payments set-
tlements as it was the only currency, which was freely convertible to gold at a ﬁxed rate
of 35 dollar/ ounce. Other currencies were tied to the dollar and could be adjusted only 
upon consultation with the IMF. The Bretton Woods regime was dependent on the abil-
ity of the US to maintain its balance of payments equilibrium. However, this require-
ment proved diﬃcult for two reasons: ﬁrst, the ﬁnancing of the Vietnam War as well as
its domestic employment and social policies could not be maintained without rising in-
ﬂation or running large deﬁcits and second, the decreasing relative competitiveness vis-
à-vis Western Europe, not the least because of the relocation of production by Ameri-
can multinationals, led to large trade deﬁcits (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999:274−275). 
The massive outﬂow of dollar eventually led to the abandonment of the gold exchange
4 Obstfeld and Taylor (2003:29−33). The idea of trilemma comes from the Mundell-Fleming model, which showed that 
in a world of perfect mobility of capital the choice of the exchange rate regime critically inﬂuences the eﬀectiveness of
monetary and ﬁscal policies in inﬂuencing employment and output. See Mundell (1963).
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standard in 1971 when the convertibility of dollar into gold was suspended and the dol-
lar was devalued. A new era of ﬁnance started when the major currencies were ﬂoat-
ing and large exchange rate volatilities were possible even for the dollar, in which most 
transactions were pursued in international trade and ﬁnance.
 The collapse of the Bretton Woods regime meant that no currency was safe
enough to rely on exclusively so there emerged a necessity for investors to hedge their 
risk, which was done via ﬁnancial innovation and internationalization (Kashiwagi 
1986:3−5). Financial innovation means the design of new ﬁnancial instruments and
techniques for unbundling the separate characteristics and risks of individual instru-
ments and reassembling them in diﬀerent combinations (Llewellyn 1992:19−20). Cur-
rency and interest rate swaps, futures, options and derivatives are some of the main 
forms of these new instruments, which allow for better pricing and allocation of risk 
at the cost of more complexity and less transparency. Internationalization of the ﬁnan-
cial markets started with the leaking capital controls during the 1970s, when the enor-
mous revenues of oil-exporting countries were invested on the London-based Euro-
dollar market and were lent out to developing countries primarily in Latin America at 
low interest rates, which were still higher than the regulated interest rates available in 
the US. By the 1980s signiﬁcant ﬁnancial transactions also took place because of the
increased level of trade and thus massive capital transfers emerged between countries 
with large current account surplus (Japan and Germany) and current account deﬁcit
(US). Given the increasing ﬁnancial interdependence among the major economies cap-
ital controls in these countries became burdensome and a widespread capital market 
deregulation took place ﬁrst in the advanced economies then in the developing world,
where the newly industrializing countries hoped to overcome the ﬁnancing constraint
on growth through attracting foreign funds. Deregulation referred to the relaxing con-
trol of foreign exchange movements, liberalization of interest rates, possibility of entry 
for foreign ﬁnancial institutions and lowering tax barriers (Kashiwagi 1986:4). Coun-
tries, which maintained these barriers, sooner or later lost their competitiveness on the 
international markets. Besides the incentives for hedging risks and the wide-spread de-
regulation of capital movements the third factor in the emergence of global ﬁnance was
the improvement of technology. The IT revolution not only made complex and diverse
transactions possible with decreasing costs but also contributed to the diﬃculty of en-
forcing capital controls. 
 The increasing level of capital mobility starting in the 1970s implied that for an
increasing number of countries the choice over the trilemma narrowed from three to two 
options: macroeconomic autonomy or ﬁxed exchange rate5. The severe consequence of
disregarding the necessity of choice between these two options was manifested almost 
immediately after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system by the collapse of the “Snake”,
which was an exchange rate mechanism within the European Community set up in 1972 
to minimize the ﬂuctuation of exchange rates. The failure by 1975 was primarily due to
the divergences in the economic policies of the members with low inﬂation and trade sur-
plus in Germany and rising inﬂation, large trade deﬁcit in other countries: there was a 
5 For many emerging economies even this choice is questionable: if interest rates are set by the major ﬁnancial centers
and the monetary authority does not possess the credibility to conduct independent macroeconomic policy then a 
ﬂexible exchange rate does not guarantee macroeconomic autonomy. See (Calvo and Mishkin 2003:107).
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constant pressure on the German mark to appreciate and the other currencies to depreci-
ate and thus the pegs were unsustainable (Dinan 1999:76). However, besides the tradition-
al considerations of the trilemma the ﬁnancial crises of the 1980s and 1990s also indicated
the presence of further dangers in the evolving new era of global capital mobility.
 The ﬁrst major shock to the system was the Latin American debt crisis in the
1980s. The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the large build up of debt from
the Eurodollar markets during the 1970s, which were ﬁrst used to cover the current ac-
count deﬁcit from the increase in oil prices but later facilitated lax monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies, which seemed acceptable given the ready availability of credit. These debts
eventually became unsustainable once US monetary policy became tighter: the interest 
on dollar-denominated debt grew instantaneously and since high rates of return were 
available elsewhere banks were not willing to ﬁnance the deﬁcits anymore. An open
default in the developing world was avoided only through multiple rounds of resched-
uling and the eventual clearing away of the non-performing loans under the Brady 
Plan (Eichengreen 2003:42−44).. The debt crisis in Latin America already demonstrated
the dangers of uncontrolled global competition: ﬁnancial institutions were willing to
take substantial risks in order to raise proﬁts, which they saw guaranteed by lending to
governments6, which were later bailed out by international actors. While the presence 
of moral hazard issues in the system was a dangerous implication of the Latin American 
debt crisis, at least it was possible to forecast the unsustainability of the situation based 
on the available information. In contrast, the timing and depth of the East Asian cri-
sis in 1997-98 was almost completely unexpected and revealed a numerous other prob-
lems of the global ﬁnancial system apart from the existence of moral hazard. Besides the
unexpectedness of the events at least two other surprising elements were present: ﬁrst,
many of these economies were considered as star performers by market participants 
and the international ﬁnancial institutions and second, the magnitude of these crises in
terms of capital account reversals and GDP contraction was much greater than expected 
(Ortiz 2002:4). The stylized development of these crises was rather similar7. First, after a
period of large-scale inﬂow of foreign capital investors decided to reduce the stock of as-
sets in the aﬀected country in response to some concerns about the fundamentals such
as the viability of pegged exchange rate, concern about large ﬁscal deﬁcits and concern
about ﬁnancial sector weaknesses. Then after this process investors shifted from evalu-
ating the fundamentals of the country to evaluating the behavior of other investors and 
a bank-run psychology took hold accelerating the rate of withdrawal. Such herding be-
havior in turn exacerbated the fundamental weaknesses and reinforced the ﬁnancial
market process. Adding to these factors was the contagion eﬀect, which means that a
crisis elsewhere in the world increases the likelihood of a speculative attack against the 
domestic currency8. Such an eﬀect is not random however: empirical evidence shows
that trade links and similarities in macroeconomic fundamentals have a signiﬁcant
explanatory power in determining whether a country will be subject to contagion or 
not (Eichengreen et al 2003:184). After the Asian crisis the ﬁscal proﬂigacy in Brazil
6 In his book Lamfalussy describes how he failed to obtain support for an oﬃcial risk-rating system among 57 major
international banks because they feared that those, which respect the procedure, could lose out on lucrative business 
to the unfair competitors (Lamfalussy 2000:13−14).
7 Review based on (Summers 2000:5−6).
8 Eichengreen et al (2003:182) estimate this increase in probability to 8 percent.
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and Russia, which had been tolerated before, was suddenly seen as unsustainable and a 
large-scale ﬁnancial crisis followed.
The frequent crises since the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime suggest that
the cost of more eﬃcient ﬁnancial intermediation at a global level is more than just giv-
ing up one of the other two choices of the trilemma. The fragility of the system implies
that apart from that choice individual countries also face a high degree of systemic risk, 
which means that any weakness in the fundamentals might lead to an exaggerated mar-
ket reaction because of herding and contagion eﬀects. Consequently minimizing vul-
nerability to such factors should be a primary objective of any open economy, which 
aims to be a net beneﬁciary from capital mobility.
III. Vulnerability to systemic risks and ﬁscal policy
Vulnerability to systemic risks has a number of facets and any assessment should con-
sider a wide range of indicators to make any prediction about crises9. However, since 
the main question of this essay relates to the conduct of ﬁscal policy I will narrow my
discussion to the issue about whether and how ﬁscal proﬂigacy might contribute to in-
creasing vulnerability to ﬁnancial shocks. Before the East Asian crisis the crucial role
of ﬁscal factors used to be part of the conventional wisdom in accordance with the pre-
dictions of the macroeconomic trilemma: according to the ﬁrst-generational models of
ﬁnancial crises with free movement of capital and any kind of exchange rate target ﬁs-
cal discipline has to be observed since with expansive monetary or ﬁscal policies the
fall in international reserves eventually leads to the abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange
rate (Kaminsky et al 1995:3). At the same time the apparent soundness of East Asian 
macroeconomic indicators questioned whether it is a decisive in bringing about crisis. 
Furthermore the central role the IMF and the World Bank attributed to ﬁscal discipline
in the management of the crisis also contributed to the questioning of the convention-
al wisdom. However, just because other factors especially institutional weaknesses in 
the ﬁnancial sector can also cause crisis does not mean that the conventional wisdom
is mistaken: a large ﬁscal deﬁcit is still one of the leading indicators for currency crisis
(Kaminsky et al 1995:12) and the experiences of Russia and Brazil is a proof to this point. 
Furthermore it might be insuﬃcient to judge macroeconomic discipline based simply
on CPI or the budget balance: the large-scale credit growth in the Asian economies 
cannot be considered as a sign of prudent monetary policy, while the oﬀ-budget liabil-
ities such the portfolios of state-owned developmental banks or state guarantees also 
implied substantial ﬁscal risk, which were not reﬂected in the central government bal-
ance (Lamfalussy 2000:104, Kopits 2004:69). It is less than a coincidence that in emerg-
ing economies there is now an increasing emphasis on comprehensive public sector 
accounts, which aim to include quasi-ﬁscal activities and contingent liabilities of the
government in order to receive a more precise picture about the true ﬁscal position10. 
The argument that ﬁnancial markets monitor ﬁscal balance can also be supported
by the reaction of interest rates to a change in budget balance, which has been subject 
to a large amount of empirical research. In a closed economy the relationship is clear: 
 9 For an overview of indicators of vulnerability see (Kaminsky et al 1995) as well as (Goldstein et al 2000).
10 For a comprehensive account of the calculation of ﬁscal balance see (Mihajlek and Tissot 2004).
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if the government has to borrow to ﬁnance its spending then it competes with the do-
mestic ﬁrms for the limited amount of ﬁnancing available. Since supply is given the in-
crease in demand has to be oﬀset by an increase in price, the interest rate. In contrast,
if the economy is open the inﬂow of foreign capital should oﬀset this interest rate in-
crease since for a small economy supply of funds can be considered unlimited so the in-
creased level of demand should have no eﬀect on the price. At the same time most em-
pirical accounts ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁscal deﬁcits and interest rates
and this eﬀect is even more signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is not actual deﬁcit
but the expectation of deﬁcit11. This implies that ﬁscal policy does matter and markets
assign a certain degree of risk premium to high level of deﬁcits. It has also been shown
empirically that the eﬀect is not linear and increases after a certain threshold of deﬁ-
cit and debt was reached (Ardagna et al 2004:2). This threshold varies across countries
and is generally lower for emerging economies, which can be illustrated by the fact that 
between 1970 and 2001 53 percent of crisis in middle-income countries occurred with 
a debt ratio lower than 60 percent (Reinhart et al 2003:13). The general explanation for
this is that characteristics of emerging market economies, such as the inherent volatil-
ity of their GDP and government revenue, weaker institutions and poor credit history, 
mean that the level of public debt these countries can sustain is lower than for industrial 
countries (IMF 2003:120). Thus these countries are particularly likely to face a large risk
premium even for a relatively modest deterioration in their ﬁscal behavior. Apart from
considerations of default there is a further reason for the presence of the risk premium: 
ﬁscal soundness is a key element of market assessment about the extent to which mon-
etary policy will be able to remain independent from political pressures and fulﬁll its
mandate for price stability (Mihajlek and Tissot 2004:17). 
Overall empirical evidence from ﬁnancial crises as well as developments in inter-
est rates suggest that ﬁscal policy is an important factor in the vulnerability of a country
to crisis and markets treat this variable accordingly. Thus if a country aims to minimize
its vulnerability to ﬁnancial volatility pursuing a credible ﬁscal policy has to be one of
the most important elements of its strategy. Failure to observe this necessity results in 
vulnerability and might lead to disproportionate punishment by the markets through 
contagion and herd behavior.
IV. Credibility of ﬁscal policy
After showing the importance of credible ﬁscal policy in the previous section now I will
consider what this concept means and what factors contribute to its improvement. The
concept of credibility was ﬁrst formalized by this year’s Nobel price winners, Finn E.
Kydland and Edward Prescott in 1977. Their main claim concerned the time inconsist-
ency problem faced by the government, which stated that a policy, which seems optimal 
at time t will unlikely to be optimal at time t+s: since economic agents will have taken 
the likely course of policy into account, the government is faced with new conditions 
asking for new solutions (Kydland and Prescott 1977:55). Since the agents are also aware 
of the changing incentive scheme they are not going to believe the government, which 
11 For a summary about the research on the eﬀects of budget deﬁcits on interest rate see (European Commission 2004),
and (Brook 2003).
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thus loses its opportunity to inﬂuence their decisions. In order to illustrate their point
the authors take the problem of inﬂation and unemployment. Once expectations on
inﬂation were incorporated into wages and prices, the government has an incentive to
create surprise inﬂation and thus decrease wage levels and expand employment. How-
ever, since rational agents are aware of this motive they incorporate higher inﬂation ex-
pectations into wage demands, which leads to a constant upward pressure on price lev-
els and thus high inﬂation (Kydland and Prescott 1977:39). Applying this logic to global 
capital markets it is clear that the promise to repay a debt might be the optimal policy 
when signing the contract but it might not be optimal to keep it at a later time: deterio-
rating fundamentals provide increasing incentives for the government to default on its 
debt, devalue the currency or introduce capital controls. As it has been discussed in the 
previous section these incentives are reﬂected in the risk premium and the Asian crisis
showed how they can ultimately lead to a herd-like investor behavior and a bank run 
psychology. 
Since the original proposal of Kydland and Prescott the model was applied to a 
large number of other policies and various solutions have been devised in order to han-
dle this problem. Acquiring and maintaining a reputation is one of the potential ways 
out of the problem of time-inconsistency. The ﬁrst to propose such solution was Rob-
ert Barro and David Gordon in 1983. In their paper they built on the idea that in mul-
tiple games the incentive structure of the policy-maker changes: once reputation enters 
into the equation then long-run considerations might outweigh short-term gains and 
the policy-maker will be more reluctant to deviate from announced policy (Barro and 
Gordon 1983:138). Such a framework is diﬀerent from the one-shot games referred to by
Kydland and Prescott, and gives a potential way out of the credibility problem. Empiri-
cal research has shown that reputation eﬀects are clearly present on the ﬁnancial mar-
kets: in the already cited paper Reinhart et al show that the level of debt intolerance in a 
country can be explained by a small number of variables: repayment history, indebted-
ness level and history of macroeconomic stability (Reinhart et al 2003:3). Thus two out
of three factors in explaining market conﬁdence relate to history implying the signiﬁ-
cance of reputation in ﬁnancial markets. This means that in assessing the credibility of
a country’s ﬁscal policy it is not enough to look at the actual level of deﬁcit but the his-
tory of macroeconomic discipline also matters. Consequently large volatility in ﬁscal
balance should be avoided in any period.  
In the absence of reputation an alternative solution to the credibility problem is to 
institutionalize commitment to a certain policy by delegating power to an independ-
ent institution, which does not share the short-term incentives of the government. This
is the idea behind the independence of the central bank, which is one of the most im-
portant applications of the credibility principle. In the ﬁeld of ﬁscal policy signiﬁcant
progress has been made recently in devising institutional solutions to the time incon-
sistency problem. Since the goal of ﬁscal policy is not one-dimensional and easily meas-
urable such as inﬂation, instead of an independent institution procedural rules have
been devised, which constrain the discretion of government in manipulating policy for 
the sake of short term policy objectives over the phases of planning, adoption and im-
plementation of the budget12. The use of these rules in practice is generally cited as one
12 For a detailed overview of the various solutions see (Perotti et al 1998, Kopits 2001, Gleich 2003).
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of the main factors behind the reduction of overall deﬁcit levels in OECD countries dur-
ing the 1990s (IMF 2001, OECD 2002).  
Overall it can be concluded that credible ﬁscal policy in the eyes of the market is a
much more complex issue than the actual ﬁscal balance and historical and institutional
factors also play a signiﬁcant role in judging credibility. In the next part of the paper I
will review how these considerations apply to present day Hungary and the implications 
these considerations have for the future conduct of ﬁscal policy.
V. Fiscal policy in Hungary
The original question of this essay is whether the postponement of the euro in Hun-
gary also means that ﬁscal adjustment can wait as well. The previous section suggests
that this is certainly not the case and consolidation should be a major objective of the 
economic policy regardless of the timing of the introduction of the euro. So far I have 
shown that in the fragile international environment why a small open economy with 
any kind of exchange rate target13 needs to follow credible ﬁscal policy in order to mini-
mize vulnerability to crisis, which can occur not only because of a sharp deterioration 
in fundamentals but also because of a contagion eﬀect. In this section I will discuss the
speciﬁc situation of Hungary and the factors, which contribute to an even higher degree
of vulnerability and make ﬁscal adjustment urgent.
As it has been shown one signal of market conﬁdence is the level of interest rate,
which has to be paid to investors to ﬁnance balance of payments deﬁcits. In Hungary
the real interest rate is persistently over 4 percent, which clearly signals a signiﬁcant
lack of conﬁdence. In the previous section I have showed that credibility is a more com-
plex concept than the actual macroeconomic indicators although those are not favora-
ble in Hungary either: close to 60 percent debt, over 5 percent ﬁscal deﬁcit, close to 7 
percent inﬂation and over 8 percent current account deﬁcit. At the same time there are
a number of other factors, which might be even more important because unlike most 
emerging economies, Hungary is not characterized by large-scale volatility or low pub-
lic revenues relative to the GDP, which usually contribute to high risk premium (IMF 
2003:120−122).
The ﬁrst issue relates the speculative attacks against the forint in 200314. The three
attacks against the currency within a single year should already be a forceful reminder 
for policy makers that EU membership in itself does not protect the currency against 
the volatility of the markets. Furthermore these events have implications for the cur-
rent policy for a number of other reasons as well. After the speculation against the lower
band of the forint in January the government became concerned about competitive-
ness of the economy and succeeded in forcing the central bank to lower the central par-
ity of the currency by 2.26 percent in June. This step not only raised doubts about the
ability of the central bank to remain independent from governmental pressures and 
13 Although in Hungary the oﬃcial policy is inﬂation targeting, there is also an exchange rate band of ±15% to the euro. 
Given the importance of foreign trade relative to the GDP the cost of the currency crucially inﬂuences domestic pric-
es and thus any target presupposes a corresponding exchange rate band. The importance of exchange rate to ﬁght
inﬂation has also increased in advanced economies as ﬁnancial innovations made the monitoring and control of
monetary aggregates extremely diﬃcult. See (Chouraqui 1993).
14 The following description is based on (UN ECE 2004:51−52).
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led to a signiﬁcant loss of credibility but also made the investors much more attentive
to fundamentals. Consequently when the methodology of calculating the current ac-
count deﬁcit changed and net reinvested proﬁts were included thus making the deﬁ-
cit 2 percent higher, markets immediately reacted to the news by selling the forint. In 
order to protect the currency the central bank was forced to increase the interest rate by 
300 basis points. Overall the legacy of these attacks is threefold: the very high interest 
rates make the needed ﬁscal adjustment much more diﬃcult and have serious implica-
tions for long-term growth prospects, investors follow fundamentals much more close-
ly, which is clearly not a favorable development for Hungary and ﬁnally the independ-
ence of the central bank came into question15. 
 Apart from the attacks on the currency the second factor contributing to the 
low level of conﬁdence is the seeming lack of commitment to the introduction of the
euro. The plan for an early introduction of the euro, which was declared in the 2002 Pre-
accession Economic Program (PEP) was abandoned a year later as it became clear that 
the path of ﬁscal adjustment and disinﬂation was untenable. In the updated 2003 PEP
the target date was 2008, which is now further postponed to 2010 and even that seems 
less and less realistic to analysts16. The continuous postponement of the date of entry is
without parallel in the history of the euro. Furthermore the less-than-ambitious reduc-
tion of the ﬁscal deﬁcit as presented in the 2004 convergence report also signals that the
government is unwilling to implement tough measures to fulﬁll the Maastricht criteri-
on. What makes the issue even more problematic is that even those convergence targets 
will not be achieved: the European Commission expects the ﬁscal deﬁcit this year is at
5.5 percent, which is 0.9 percentage point higher than the target indicated in the con-
vergence report.  
 The third problem contributing to the lack of conﬁdence in the Hungarian
economy relates to the overly politicized environment since the 2002 elections, when a 
sharp deterioration took place in the budget and the ﬁscal deﬁcit increased to 9.2 per-
cent. While around 2.9 percent of this deﬁcit was due to a diﬀerent method of calcu-
lation and the inclusion of quasi-ﬁscal activities into the budget, a signiﬁcant part of
it was the result of pre-election loosening and post-election populist policies to fulﬁll
election promises. Furthermore political tensions remained signiﬁcant even the follow-
ing year so consolidation was not undertaken, leading to another very high level of def-
icit at 6.2 percent of the GDP. This means that during pre-election and election years,
investors do not expect improvement in the fundamentals but rather prepare for a de-
terioration contributing to an increase in the risk premium. This attitude is reﬂected in
the reports by leading international agencies such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
which emphasize that no improvement on the ﬁscal side can be expected within the
next two years because of the pressure on the government from the party to win the 
next elections (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 22).
While the previous factors show that the reputation element of credibility has been 
highly eroded over the past two years, the institutional element appears just as problem-
atic since ﬁscal processes in Hungary are extremely week even in comparison to other
15 The recently adopted legislation, which increases the number of members in the monetary council and provides 
greater power to the prime minister in their nomination, does not signal the respect for monetary policy independ-
ence either.
16 The changing expectations about the date of introducing the euro in Hungary are described by Csermely (2004).
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Central and Eastern European countries. This is indicated by a recent ECB study, which
develops a composite index summarizing the institutional characteristics of the budget 
preparation, adoption and implementation phases according to their eﬀect on solving
the common pool dilemma, which emerges when spending can be targeted to particu-
lar constituencies and revenues are centralized so politicians have an incentive to in-
ternalize the beneﬁts and assume only a fraction of the social costs17. The main results,
which are presented in the table below, speak for themselves: based on the numbers it 
is striking that Hungary’s ﬁscal framework is only slightly better than that of Romania
and signiﬁcantly worse than that of the next on the list, Bulgaria.
The strength of ﬁscal processes in Central Europe18
     INDEX RANKING
Bulgaria 6.08 8
Czech Republic 7.19 5
Estonia 8.32 1
Hungary 5.32 9
Latvia 8.00 2
Lithuania 6.20 7
Poland 7.78 3
Romania 5.19 10
Slovakia 6.62 6
Slovenia 7.69 4
Hungary’s low composite score comes from all three phases of decision-making 
over the budget. In the preparation phase the main weakness is the lack of any limit on 
borrowing as well as the weak position of the ﬁnance minister in the compilation of the
budget. In the adoption phase the lack of constraints over the legislature in amending 
the draft budget only with indicating oﬀsetting changes also contribute to the weak-
ness of the process in Hungary and stands in contrast with the practice in other coun-
tries such Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. In the implementation phase the 
discretion of the ﬁnance minister to transfer funds between chapters as well as the high
threshold for the obligation to submit a supplementary budget to Parliament also pro-
vides room for maneuver to overspend. In Estonia, which has the strongest institutional 
framework for ﬁscal policy, the government is required to submit supplementary budget
to the Parliament not only at the time of breaching the deﬁcit limit but also when there
is an unexpected surplus.
Overall the low credibility of Hungarian economic policy, which is signaled both 
by the current level of interest rates as well as by the weak reputation and institutional 
framework I have described above implies that the country can be considered vulner-
able to capital volatility and contagion. Consequently there is no choice about ﬁscal ad-
justment even if accession to the euro zone might be postponed. The logic is precisely
17 Gleich (2003: 5−6). The detailed method of calculating the index can be found in Appendix A.
18 The table is a shortened version of the table in (Gleich 2003:25). The complete table is in Appendix B. 
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the opposite: the later we introduce the euro the longer the forint will face the volatility 
of global capital markets and the more vulnerable it will remain to speculative attacks. 
As it could be seen from the East Asian crisis strong growth performance alone is insuf-
ﬁcient to protect an economy from contagion.
While the current rate of high growth in Hungary does not necessarily protect 
against speculation, it presents the opportunity for adjustment. In OECD countries em-
pirical evidence shows that ﬁscal consolidation is more likely to be undertaken during a
period when the economy is doing well relatively to other OECD economies (Von Hagen 
et al 2001:14). Prior to the introduction of the euro high-growth countries were more 
successful in reducing their debt and deﬁcit burden than low-growth countries (Hugh-
es Hallett et al 2003:52). An important reason for this diﬀerence is the procyclicality of
markets, which means during periods of high rate of growth it is easier to bring about a 
favorable market sentiment, which eases the adjustment through an expectation eﬀect:
investors make their decision on the basis of expected lower deﬁcit, which might lower
the risk premium and thus make adjustment less costly for example through declining 
debt service ratio. In contrast tightening during an economic downturn might be a lot 
more painful as ﬁscal contraction during an economic downturn generally prolongs the
recovery from crisis. At the same time these considerations do not mean that growth 
in itself will take care of the deﬁcit: during a period of high growth there is pressure
on the government to redistribute the windfall revenue and without an explicit eﬀort
to prevent such process revenue increase is likely to be followed by an expenditure in-
crease or tax cuts (OECD 2003:129).. Consequently, Keynes’ idea about counter-cyclical 
ﬁscal policy is likely to be applied asymmetrically: there will be more spending during
economic downturns but no adjustment during economic booms19. Empirical evidence 
also shows that growth without restraint on spending is insuﬃcient for lasting consoli-
dation of public ﬁnances (Reinhart et al 2003:35). Overall these considerations suggest 
that the current rate of high growth in Hungary presents a favorable opportunity for 
starting consolidation but it can be achieved only through an active eﬀort of the gov-
ernment to restrain spending instead of distributing the additional revenue. In contrast 
if ﬁscal consolidation is delayed until an economic downturn or a crisis makes it inevi-
table the pain of the adjustment is likely to be signiﬁcantly larger.
Starting a ﬁscal adjustment however is only the ﬁrst step to regain the conﬁdence
of the markets. Apart from consolidation the government also has to signal that the 
pressures for overspending will not reemerge and the country will conduct responsi-
ble ﬁscal policies in the future as well. In order to make this credible institutional re-
forms addressing the problems of the budgetary process are indispensable. The State
Accounting Agency has made a number of proposals to improve ﬁscal management
such as decreasing the threshold for the obligation to submit a supplementary budg-
et, changing the schedule for the budget process as well as strengthening the require-
ment for the submission of impact studies along with the requests for ﬁnancing (Állami 
Számvevőszék 2004:5−6). The implementation of these proposals could be the starting
point of building long-term credibility for Hungarian ﬁscal policy.
19 This is one of the main criticisms of Buchanan and Wagner (1977) against Keynesian policies in democracies, which 
are particularly prone to such asymmetrical application.
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VI. Conclusions
The main question of this paper was whether the postponement of the euro because of
the potential trade oﬀ between real and nominal convergence implies that ﬁscal adjust-
ment can be postponed as well. After the review of the emergence of the global ﬁnancial
markets it has been shown that we are in a new era of ﬁnance when besides the choice
over the traditional trilemma new costs are present in the system as well in the form of 
higher risks. These risks include the dangers of herding and contagion, which mean that
any weakness in the fundamentals might provoke disproportionate response by mar-
ket players and thus in order for a country to beneﬁt from the ready availability of ﬁ-
nance it has to minimize its vulnerability to these kinds of risks. While vulnerability is 
a composition of a large number of factors, sound ﬁscal policy and sustainable debt level
are crucial ingredients. Thus in order to minimize vulnerability, small open economies
have to pursue credible policies in these areas. 
Applying this framework to Hungary it is evident that these considerations mean 
that ﬁscal consolidation is unavoidable and the low credibility of the country’s econom-
ic policy both because of reputation issues as well as institutional weakness further in-
tensify the pressure to adjust. On a more optimistic note it has also been noted that the 
present rate of growth provides a good opportunity to adjust and introduce institution-
al changes, which would contribute to the long-term credibility of ﬁscal policy. Over-
all the conclusion from this paper is that given the high degree of vulnerability neither 
EMU accession nor ﬁscal consolidation can wait in Hungary. Once we consider the
risks from the global ﬁnancial markets it becomes clear that the trade oﬀ between real
and nominal convergence might be greatly aggravated if accession to the euro-zone is 
postponed for too long. 
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20 Source: (Gleich 2003:14�15). 
Appendix A20
20 Source: (Gleich 2003:14−15).
The Risks of Global Financial Markets and the Importance of Credibility… 15
18
16 Dóra Győrﬀy
Appendix B21 
21 Source: (Gleich 2003:25).
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The Risks of Global Financial Markets and the Importance of Credibility… 17
Bibliography
Afonso, Antonio and Rolf Strauch (2003): Fiscal Policy Events and Interest Rate Swap Spreads: Evidence 
from the EU. ECB Working Paper Series, No. 303.
Állami Számvevőszék (2004): Vélemény és javaslatok a kormány takarékossági intézkedéseinek meg-
alapozásához. (Opinion and Recommendations for the Saving Measures of the Government). 
Report available at: http://www.asz.gov.hu
Andrikopoulos, Andreas, Ioannis Loizides and Kyprianos Prodromidis (2004): Fiscal Policy and Political 
Business Cycles in the EU. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20. 125−152.
Ardagna, Silvia, Francesco Caselli and Timothy Lane (2004): Fiscal Policy and the Cost of Public Debt 
Service: Some estimates from OECD Countries. NBER Working Paper, No. 10788.
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon (1983): Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary 
Policy. Reprinted in: Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1990): Macroeconomic Policy, Cred-
ibility and Politics. Harwood Academic Publishers, 99−121.
Brook, Anne-Marie (2003): Recent and Prospective Trends in Real Long-Term Interest Rates: Fiscal Policy 
and Other Drivers. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 367.
Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wagner (1977): Democracy in Deﬁcit: The Political Legacy of Lord
Keynes. Academic Press INC, San Diego and London.
Buti, Marco and Paul van den Noord (2003): Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The Experience of 
the early Years of EMU. OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 351. 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Frederic S. Mishkin (2003): The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging 
Market Countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17. No. 4. 99−118.
Chouraqui, Jean-Claude (1993): Financial Liberalization and Monetary Policy.” in: Cavanna, Henry ed. Fi-
nancial Innovation. Routledge, London and New York, 69−79. 
Csajbók, Attila and Ágnes Csermely eds. (2002): Az euró bevezetésének várható hasznai, költségei és 
időzítése. (The expected beneﬁts, costs and timing of the introduction of the euro.) Occasional
Papers No. 2002/24. National Bank of Hungary, Budapest.
Csermely, Ágnes (2004): Convergence Expectations and Convergence Strategies. Lessons from the Hun-
garian Experiences in the pre-EU Period. Comparative Economic Studies Vol. 46. No. 1. 104−126.
Dinan, Desmond (1999): Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Second edition. 
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, Boulder, Colorado.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2004): Hungary – Country Report. August.
Eichengreen, Barry (2003): Capital Flows and Crises. MIT Press, Cambridge and London.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew Rose and Charles Wyplos (2003): Contagious Currency Crises. In: Eichen-
green (2003), 155−186.
Edwards, Sebastian (2000): Contagion. The World Economy, Vol. 23. No. 7. 873−900.
Eörsi, János (2004): Mozgó célpontok. (Moving Targets). Figyelő, No. 42. 14−16.
Erdős, Tibor (2003): Fenntartható gazdasági növekedés. (Sustainable Economic Development.) 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.
European Central Bank (2004): Convergence Report 2004. 
European Commission (2004): Public Finance in EMU – 2004. European Economy 3. Brussels.
Feldstein, Martin and Charles Horioka (1980): Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows. Eco-
nomic Journal, Vol. 90. June, 314−329.
Gale, William and Peter Orszag (2002): The Economic Eﬀects of Long-Term Fiscal Discipline. Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center Discussion Paper, December 17.
Gleich, Holger (2003): Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries. European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 215. 
Goldstein, Morris, Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (2000): Assessing Financial Vulnerability: 
An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets. Institutie for International Economics, Washing-
ton DC.
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, John Lewis and Jurgen von Hagen (2003): Fiscal Policy in Europe 1991−2003: 
An Evidence-Based Analysis. Center for Economic Policy Research, London. 
IMF (2001): Fiscal in Advanced Economies: How Long Will it Last? World Economic Outlook, May, 
85−115.
18 Dóra Győrﬀy
IMF (2003): Public Debt in Emerging Markets: Is It Too High? World Economic Outlook, September, 
113−152.
Kaminsky, Graciela, Saul Lizondo and Carment Reinhart (1998): Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. 
IMF Staﬀ Papers, Vol. 45. No. 1. 1−48.
Kashiwagi, Yusuke (1986): The Emergence of Global Finance. 1986 Per Jacobsson Lecture. Available: 
http://www.perjacobbson.org
Kenwood, George and A. L Lougheed (1999): The Growth of the International Economy 1820−2000. 
Fourth edition. Routledge, London and New York.
Kopits, George (2001): Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornaments? IMF Working 
Paper, No. 01/145.
Kopits, George (2004): Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility. In: Kopits (ed.) Rules-Based Fiscal Poli-
cy in Emerging Markets: Background, Analysis and Prospects. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
66−80.
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1977): Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Op-
timal Plans. Reprinted in: Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1990): Macroeconomic Policy, 
Credibility and Politics. Harwood Academic Publishers, 35−56.
Lamfalussy, Alexandre (2000): Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: An Essay on Financial Globalization 
and Fragility. Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Llewellyn, David (1992): Financial Innovation: A Basic Analysis. In: Cavanna, Henry (ed.) Financial Inno-
vation. Routledge, London and New York, 14−51.
Mihaljek, Dubravko and Bruno Tissot (2004): Fiscal Position in Emerging Economies: Central Banks’ Per-
spective. Fiscal Issues and Central Banking in Emerging Economies. Bank of International Settle-
ments Working Paper, No. 20. 10−37.
Mundell, Robert A. (1963): Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange 
Rates. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 26. No. 4. 475−485.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor (2003): Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
OECD (2002): Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules. OECD Economic Outlook, 72. 
117−136.
Ortiz, Guillermo (2002): Recent Emerging Market Crises: What Have We Learnt? 2002 Per Jacobsson Lec-
ture. Available: http://www.perjacobsson.org
Perotti, Roberto, Rolf Strauch and Jurgen Von Hagen (1998): Sustainability of Public Finances. CEPR and 
ZEI, London.
Reinhart, Carmen, Kenneth Rogoﬀ and Miguel A. Savastano (2003): Debt Intolerance. Brookings Paper 
on Economic Activity, No. 1. 1−74.
Spahn, Heinz-Peter (2001): From Gold to Euro: On Monetary Theory and the History fo Currency Systems. 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Summers, Lawrence (2000): International Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences and Cures. American 
Economic Review, Vol. 90. No. 2. 1−16. 
Taylor, Alan M. (2004): Global Finance: Past and Present. Finance and Development, March, 28−31. 
Von Hagen, Jurgen, Andrew Hughes Hallett and Rolf Strauch (2001): Budgetary Consolidation in EMU. 
Economic Paper, No. 148. Commission of the European Communities Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Aﬀairs, Brussels.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2004): Economic Survey of Europe 2004.: UN ECE, 
Geneva.
